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DIVINE COMMAND, DIVINE WILL, AND 
MORAL OBLIGATION 
Mark C. Murphy 
In this article I consider the respective merits of three interpretations of divine 
command theory. On OCT}, S's being morally obligated to <iJ depends on 
God's command that S <iJ; on OCT2, that moral obligation depends on God's 
willing that S be morally obligated to <iJ; on OCT3, that moral obligation 
depends on God's willing that S <iJ. I argue that the positive reasons that have 
been brought forward in favor of DCn have implications theists would find 
disturbing and that the positive reasons brought forward in favor of OCT2 
support only a weak formulation of OCT2 that is indistinguishable from other 
theistic moral theories. OCT3 is, however, a distinctive theory that theists have 
strong reasons to affirm. 
Philip Quinn has usefully distinguished between two sorts of task that the 
advocate of a divine command theory of ethics (hereafter OCT) might 
engage in: that of defending OCT against the standard (and not-so-stan-
dard) objections that have been leveled against it, and that of providing 
"good positive reasons" for affirming that theory.' There is a third task 
that merits attention, though, and that does not fit neatly into either catego-
ry: that of specification of what it is that OCT asserts. What does OCT 
affirm concerning the connection between God and morality? What pre-
cisely are the relata, and what precisely is the nature of the relationship? 
This task of determining what specific formulation OCT should receive is, 
of course, not unrelated to the other two. Rescuing OCT from objections 
may involve the task of specifying that theory more completely or refor-
mulating its fundamental theses; and the particular formulation that OCT 
receives is likely to be shaped by the positive reasons there are for accep-
tance of that view. 
Part of the discussion concerning what formulation OCT should receive 
has focused on the nature of the relationship between God and morality: 
whether the connection between certain states of affairs involving God's 
will or God's commands and certain states of affairs involving moral 
requirements should be construed as a relationship of identity, or causa-
tion, or perhaps supervenience. As far as is possible, 1 shall not deal with 
the issue of the relationship between these states of affairs. Rather, I want 
to focus on the issue of what states of affairs involving God should be 
taken to be fundamental to OCT.2 Consider, for example, the following 
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three distinct theses concerning moral obligation that a defender of DCT 
might affirm: 
(DCT1) The state of affairs of S's being morally obligated 
to <I> depends on the state of affairs of God's commanding 
S to <I> 
(DCT2) The state of affairs of S's being morally obligated 
to <I> depends on the state of affairs of God's willing that S 
be morally obligated to <I> 
(DCT3) The state of affairs of S's being morally obligated 
to <I> depends on the state of affairs of God's willing that S 
<1>3 
Call DCn a command formulation of DCT; call OCT2 and OCT3 will formula-
tions of OCT. Now, DCT1, DCT2, and DCT3 are not very fine-grained for-
mulations of OCT's theory of moral obligation.4 They are, for example, 
silent on the issue of what the dependence relation consists in, whether it is 
identity, or supervenience, or a causal relationship of some sort. Their 
silence on this issue is intentional, though, for I want to focus on the relata 
rather than the relation.5 Should the defender of DCT affirm a command 
or a will formulation of OCT? If a will formulation is affirmed, what is the 
act of willing that is relevant? 
OCTI 
DCT1 is considered the standard formulation of DCT both by those 
sympathetic to and by those critical of divine command theories of ethics. 
Robert Adams, whose work was crucial to the rebirth of this type of ethical 
theory, clearly endorses the command formulation of DCT over will for-
mulations." In spite of the impeccability of its credentials as the traditional 
formulation of OCT, though, it is worthwhile to ask whether good reasons 
can be found for preferring this formulation of DCT. 
It seems to me that the best argument in favor of Dcn over DCT2 and 
DCT3 turns on a purported analogy between the way that voluntary 
human activity generates obligations and the way that voluntary divine 
activity generates obligations.7 When humans impose obligations either on 
themselves or on others, these obligations are the result of the performance 
of certain speech-acts. Consider two examples. First, promises: I may will 
to give you a dollar, but I am not obligated to give you the dollar unless I 
make a promise to do so. Second, orders: a sergeant may will that a pri-
vate scrub the latrine, but the private is under no obligation to scrub the 
latrine until the sergeant orders him or her to do so. It is important to note 
that it is not just that the act of will is not sufficient for the existence of the 
obligation in these cases; it is not even necessary, and the promise and the 
order can produce obligations even if the will is opposed to what is 
promised or ordered. I might lack the will to give you a dollar, and might 
even have a will that is opposed to it, yet my promise to give you a dollar 
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nonetheless generates an obligation to hand it over. The sergeant might 
lack the will that the private scmb the latrine, and might even have a will 
that is opposed to it (perhaps the sergeant cares not for matters of hygiene, 
or wants the private to disobey so that he or she can be brought up on 
charges of insubordination), yet the order to scmb the latrine still generates 
an obligation to do the job. 
Humans impose obligations on themselves and others by way of 
speech-acts. Mere willing is not sufficient, and is not even necessary. If 
God's obligation-producing activity is analogous to that of humans, then 
we might take Dcn to be the preferable formulation of DCT, for it makes 
moral obligation depend on God's commands, which are divine speech-
acts. It seems, though, that accepting this analogy would have disturbing 
implications for divine command theorists regarding God's capacity to 
impose obligations. 
To make clear why this is so, I will need to say some things about how 
ordinary human speech-acts generate obligations. I take it that it is a com-
monly held view that while a purely empirical set of conditions can be laid 
down for what counts as the making of a promise or the giving of an order 
(that certain words are uttered, that the utterer of the words possesses cer-
tain beliefs and intentions, and the like), both the status of these empirical-
ly-specifiable acts as promises or orders and the status of these acts as 
engendering obligations depend on the obtaining of institutional facts. B 
The mles that constitute the familiar practice of promising, that is, both 
determine when a valid promise has been made and imply that a promise 
is an undertaking of an obligation; and the mles that define the relation-
ships between military superiors and inferiors specify what counts as a 
non-defective order and make it the case that when a non-defective order 
has been issued the person to whom it has been issued is bound to comply 
with it. If there were not these constitutive mles, not only would it not be 
the case that promises and orders impose obligations, it would not be the 
case that there are promises and orders at all. 
If human speech-acts generate obligations in this way, then there is rea-
son to doubt the analogy between God's obligation-imposing activity and 
human obligation-imposing activity. It seems that if the fact of analogy is 
to give support for DCTl, then God's speech-acts must impose obligations 
in the same way that humans' speech-acts impose obligations. While I 
think that one kind of worry that attends this proposal can be shown to be 
less weighty than it might initially appear, another shows that this pur-
ported analogy would have consequences that are intolerable for most 
defenders of DCT. 
One worry that could immediately be pressed against this conclusion is 
that even if God's commands generate obligations in the way that human 
speech-acts do, the obligations are nothing like the moral obligations that 
the defender of OCT is concerned to uncover. While Searle, for example, 
defends the view that one can derive from the fact of a promise the exis-
tence of an obligation to perform, he freely admits that he does not show 
that the obligation in question is moral, and he even suggests that there are 
reasons to believe that the promissory obligation is not a moral obligation." 
Since Searle's derivation is not specific to promises but could be applied to 
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all obligations resulting from speech-acts, the same point could be made 
about obligations generated by orders or commands. Rawls, upon dis-
cussing the constitutive conventions that govern the practice of promise-
making, notes that those rules are on a par with the rules of games, and do 
not become morally binding except by way of a true moral principle that 
entails that adherence to those rules is morally required.10 Thus, we could 
not rest by explaining moral obligation in terms of God's commands, but 
would have to invoke an independent moral principle which implies that 
adherence to obligations resulting from divine commands is morally bind-
ing. Perhaps even more directly to the point is an argument made by John 
Simmons against the view that the moral obligation to obey the law can be 
explained in terms of positional duties or institutional requirements. 
Contrary to the views of those who hold that anyone who uses the term 
"law" correctly or knows what citizenship is recognizes that citizens have 
an obligation to obey the law, Simmons argues that this putative obliga-
tion, if there is such a thing, is of no moral weight; positional duties are not 
moral duties, and institutional requirements are not moral requirements. 11 
Similarly, one could argue that even if God's speech-acts do generate oblig-
ations like promises and orders do, these are not moral obligations, and so 
even if the analogy between human and divine speech-acts holds, this 
analogy provides no reason to affirm the view that DCTI is the preferable 
formulation of OCT. 
Searle, Rawls, and Simmons agree that the obligations that arise as a 
result of institutional facts are not moral obligations at all. This might be 
thought to be a decisive objection to the defense of DCT1: for if no speech-
acts generate moral obligations, then God's speech-acts do not generate 
moral obligations. I think, though, that this objection is not decisive. 
Simmons' argumentative strategy derives its success from the fact that 
without begging any questions he can rely on a neutral and unproblematic 
account of moral obligation with which he can effectively contrast certain 
institutional requirements. But we are precluded from employing a strate-
gy of this sort by the foundational nature of the enquiry that we are 
engaged in. We are not concerned, as Simmons is, with asking whether 
particular institutional requirements impose moral obligations. We are 
concerned, rather, with asking whether moral obligation could itself be one 
kind of institutional requirement, that is, obligation that results from 
speech-acts that God performs. We cannot assume a contrast without beg-
ging the question. 
It might help to imagine the following form of life, and how in this form 
of life the obligations generated by God's commands have the foundation-
al place that is often associated with moral requirements. Suppose that 
there is a human community that is thoroughly theocentric. One way that 
this theocentrism is manifested is that within this community there is an 
institution, similar in some respects to our institution of promising, called 
the institution of "divine commanding." Divine commanding is itself an 
act that can be empirically-specified: it occurs paradigmatically when God 
utters the words "I command that ... " and thereupon predicates some 
future action to some person, and God possesses certain beliefs, intentions, 
etc. By using this form of speaking, God intends to perform an act quite 
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different than that of merely reporting a wish or want, and in virtue of the 
constitutive rules of the institution anyone who asserts that 5 has been 
divinely commanded to <iJ is committed to the view that 5 is obligated to <iJ. 
These "divine command obligations" are ultimate in the following sense: 
all other obligations that persons within that community see themselves as 
being bound by are in some sense regulated by divine command obliga-
tions. 50, it is the case that even if one recognizes that he or she is under a 
promissory obligation by making a promise, the normative force of this 
obligation is referred to a divine command obligation, perhaps an obliga-
tion that one adhere to his or her promissory obligations. In this communi-
ty divine command obligations are ultimate; there are no obligations of a 
kind more fundamental than they to which divine command obligations 
could be contrasted to their detriment. The point is not that this is an 
attractive view of morality. Rather, the point is that with regard to such a 
society it does not seem a decisive objection to assert that no matter what 
the institutional requirements are, it is clear that they are not moral require-
ments. Within such a form of life, the obligations generated by Cod's 
speech-acts seem to fill the role of moral requirements. 
The worry about making the case for God's obligation-engendering 
activity depend on an analogy ,\Tith human obligation-imposing activity is 
not that it requires an absurd view of morality, but rather that (as the story 
I had to tell makes clear) it makes God's capacity to obligate dependent on 
the existence of certain highly specific forms of community that are con-
ventional and for the most part do not exist at all. The worry is that on 
such a view God's obligation-producing power is objectionably contingent. 
God could not impose obligations on the persons that do not inhabit this 
form of community, and that means that most persons would be insuscep-
tible to having obligations imposed on them by Cod. 
My view is that acceptance of the analogy between human and divine 
obligation-engendering activity as support for ocn would commit one to 
a view of God's power to impose obligations which the defender of OCT 
would find objectionably contingent. One might respond, though, by 
questioning my claim that certain institutional rules would need to be in 
place for God to be able to impose obligations. "Forget the institutional 
rules," the objector might say. "Why should we not simply hold that it is a 
moral principle that those to whom God has issued a command are bound 
to obey that command?" One could say this, I suppose; but note that this 
proposal does not enjoy the analogical support that the earlier defense of 
OCT1 enjoyed. The analogy between the human and the divine imposition 
of obligations, were it successful, would militate in favor of OCTl over 
OCT2 and OCT3. But if one merely asserts that there is a moral principle 
that one ought to obey God's commands, it is open to ask why one holds 
that view rather than the view that (perhaps) there is a moral principle that 
one ought to obey Cod's will. The analogy supports the command formu-
lation of OCT over the will formulations. If one discards the institutional 
rules picture, though, one must discard the analogy, the rationale for pre-
ferring ocn to OCT2 and OCT3. 
I think, then, that the analogical argument for ocn is not successful.!2 
But there is an argument for ocn that does not depend on any appeal to 
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analogy between human and divine obligation-imposing activity. The con-
tent of God's will is, to put it mildly, very difficult to know without God's 
making it known by way of His commands. But it might be thought that 
what we are morally obligated to do must be knowable, so that unless God's 
will is made known by His issuing commands, one cannot be under any 
moralobligations. il Support for this view might be drawn from the "ought 
implies can" principle. It might be thought that since acting on moral 
requirements is not possible unless one is able to know of their existence, 
there is reason to prefer a formulation of OCT that connects moral obliga-
tions to God's knowable commands rather than God's unknowable will. 
There are at least two things that can be said in response to this argu-
ment. First, it should be noted that the formulation of the "ought implies 
can" principle that is relied on in this argument is itself questionable. In 
order for the argument to be successful in establishing that command is 
even a necessary condition of obligation, the principle must be interpreted 
so that being bound by an obligation to (jl implies that one can (jl under the 
description "fulfilling an obligation." It is only by interpreting the princi-
ple to have this implication that one can deduce that one must be aware of 
the status of an action as obligatory if there is to be an obligation to per-
form it; only by giving this sort of interpretation of "ought implies can" can 
the knowability requirement be defended as an a priori condition that any 
account of moral obligation must satisfy. But it is not obvious to me, at any 
rate, that it could not be the case that one ought to (jl yet one is in a position 
such that one cannot know that one ought to (jl. Rather, this strikes me as 
simply a rather innocuous form of realism about moral requirements. It 
should be noted, however, that to say that one is under a moral require-
ment that one cannot know about in present circumstances is not to say 
that one is culpable if one does not follow that moral requirement. While 
there is on my view little to be gained by denying that there can be obliga-
tions that we cannot, in present circumstances, know about, there is much 
to be said for the view that one cannot be considered blameworthy (or 
praiseworthy) for violating (or adhering to) moral requirements that he or 
she was in no position to know about. 
Secondly, even if we grant that the truth of "ought implies can" shows 
that there is a sense in which moral obligation has to depend on divine 
command within a OCT view, dependence in this sense is not what is at 
stake between advocates of OCT1 and advocates of OCT2 and OCT3. It 
will be useful to adopt here a distinction employed by Howard Warrender 
between grounds of obligation and the validating conditions of obligation." 
This distinction between grounds and validating conditions is not, I think, 
one that can be spelled out in purely logical terms. The distinction is, 
rather, that between a cause, or source, and the circumstances in which a 
cause can operate or a source can issue its product. 15 Now, even if the truth 
of the "ought implies can" thesis implies that moral obligation in OCT 
must depend on divine command, all that would follow is that the expres-
sion of God's will is at least a validating condition of moral obligation. But 
it seems to me that the dispute between defenders of command formula-
tions and will formulations of OCT is not about the validating conditions 
of moral obligation, but rather its grounds. (A defender of a will formula-
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tion could, it seems, affirm that command is a validating condition of 
moral obligation without straying at all from his or her thesis.) The posi-
tive argument for OCTI that relies on "ought implies can" is therefore not 
strong enough to provide reasons to prefer that thesis to OCT2 and OCT3. 
The arguments that favor a command formulation of OCT over a will 
formulation do not withstand scrutiny. Before we turn to an examination 
of the specific will formulations OCT2 and OCT3, we should consider 
whether will formulations generically considered have anything to recom-
mend them over the command formulation. We are aided in answering 
this question by the fact that both Quinn and Edward Wierenga, who 
along with Adams are largely responsible for the revival of OCT, have 
noted in passing that on their views it is not divine command that is of fun-
damental importance for OCT but rather divine will. 
Wierenga offers as a justification for preferring will formulations over 
command formulations the ability that the former have to solve certain 
puzzles, such as that posed by the case of Abraham and Isaac. He writes 
that by affirming a will formulation of OCT, the defender of OCT need not 
"take God's command that Abraham kill Isaac as indicating God's desire 
that some particular act of Abraham's killing Isaac be performed. Rather, 
God issued that command to reveal what He really wanted, or to induce 
Abraham to do what he really wanted, which was that Abraham, out of a 
desire to obey God, prepare to sacrifice Isaac."16 Even if one does not 
endorse Wierenga's particular analysis of the case of Abraham and Isaac, 
one might think that will formulations have advantages over command 
formulations with regard to the implications these formulations have in 
cases in which what God commands and what God wills pull apart. OCTl 
implies that if God's commands conflict with God's will, then it is God's 
commands that dictate morality; and OCT1 implies that if God wills a 
human action yet fails to command it, that action is not morally required. 
If we think that it is possible for God to issue a command which He wills 
us not to adhere to, and that in such cases we would be morally obligated 
to follow God's will rather than to adhere to the command, we would have 
reason to affirm a will formulation over a command formulation. (Is it 
possible for God to test us by commanding something that He wills that 
we not do?') We might also wonder whether there might be moral 
requirements that God has not told us about yet; OCT2 and OCT3 do not 
imply the impossibility of this state of affairs, but OCTI does. (God might 
will, for example, that we perform a certain action without being com-
manded to do so. OCTl implies that it could not be a violation of a moral 
obligation not to act in accordance with this will; OCT2 and OCT3 imply 
that it could.) 
Quinn, on the other hand, does not appeal to puzzle-solving capacities 
to justify the preference for will formulations of OCT over command for-
mulations. He writes that he prefers to formulate OCT in terms of divine 
will rather than divine command because "it is at the deepest level God's 
will, and not his commands, which merely express his will, that determines 
the deontological status of actions."IS What QUinn's remark captures is 
that God's commands might not seem to be of importance except insofar as 
those commands express what God's will is; God's commands are mere 
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means to express His will. Now, one might say: there seems to be more of 
importance about commands than the expression of will. But if my criti-
cisms of the analogical argument are correct, it will be difficult to show 
how God's commands could be more than expressions of His will, except 
in very limited and special circumstances. 
The rationales provided by Wierenga and Quinn for acceptance of will 
formulations of OCT over the command formulation are not, of course, 
decisive. To find better reasons for accepting a will formulation, I think 
that we shall have to look to the particular formulations OCT2 and OCT3, 
and see what grounds for acceptance they present. Before we turn to those 
accounts, though, we should note that there is some price to be paid for 
accepting a will view over the command view. Quinn takes part of the dis-
tinctiveness of OCT to be its affirmation that God's commands do not sim-
ply inform us of the existence of certain obligations, but impose the obliga-
tions on us. But note that if we decide that it is the will of God and not His 
commands that does the work, then we must disagree with Quinn's asser-
tion and hold that according to OCT God's commands are relevant to 
morality only in an informative capacity, because they express to us what 
the content of God's will is. If we decide on reflection that God necessarily 
does not command what He does not will, then we can make the same 
claim that many natural law views make, simply that what God says is an 
infallible guide to what is morally required. If, on the other hand, we hold 
that God might command what He does not will, then a particular one of 
God's commands might be among a number of factors that are considered 
in order to discern what God wills. This price is small, though, for the 
claim about God's commands can be transformed into a claim about God's 
will with apparently little sacrifice. One can claim that God's will is not 
merely reflective of moral requirements, but is constitutive or productive 
of them. And this does seem to capture what the defenders of OCT want 
for their view, a view which Quinn occasionally and more accurately calls 
"theological voluntarism." 
DCT2 
OCT2 and OCT3 are versions of theological voluntarism. Both of them 
assert that moral requirements depend on God's Will.19 But they differ in a 
crucial respect. DCT2 asserts that the act of will that is relevant is God's 
will that some person be bound by a moral requirement to perform a cer-
tain action. OCT3 asserts that the act of will that is relevant is sin1ply God's 
will that some person perform a certain action. I know of no plausible will 
formulation of OCT other than OCT2 and OCT3. If, then, defenders of 
OCT reject command formulations, they should accept either OCT2 or 
OCT3. But which of these is preferable? 
I want to argue that there are good reasons for rejecting OCT2 as the 
preferred formulation of OCT. I will first show that OCT2 admits of a 
metaethical and a normative interpretation.20 I will then argue that the pos-
itive reasons that have been brought forward in favor of OCT2 support 
only the metaethical and not the normative interpretation. I shall show, 
though, that the meta ethical interpretation of OCT2 is not distinctive; it 
does not adequately distinguish the defender of OCT from defenders of 
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other ethical views. While DCT2 can be reformulated so that it is distinc-
tive, this reformulation is ad hoc, unmotivated by any of the positive rea-
sons brought forward for accepting it. 
DCT2 asserts that S's being morally required to <I> depends on God's 
willing that S be morally required to <1>. But this can be given either a nor-
mative or a meta ethical interpretation. On the normative interpretation of 
DCT2 - call it DCT2-N - the following normative state of affairs obtains: 
all humans are morally required to do what God wills that they be morally 
required to do. In virtue of this general moral requirement, particular 
actions that God wills that we be morally required to perform become 
actual moral requirements. The idea expressed by DCT2-N, that is, is that 
humans owe God obedience with regard to what God wills that humans 
be required to do. There is a moral requirement on all humans to obey 
God's will; the particular moral obligations that humans have are all speci-
fications of this general moral requirement, determinations of what must 
be done in concrete circumstances if one is to render this obedience. On 
the other hand, the metaethical interpretation of DCT2 - call it DCT2-M 
- does not appeal to a general moral requirement that is particularized by 
the content of God's will. Rather, the claim is that God creates moral 
requirements ex nihilo, that is, out of normative nothingness. 
It seems to me that meta ethical and normative versions of DCT2 are eas-
ily confounded. The likely source of this confusion is that both of them 
imply that if God wills that humans be morally required to <1>, then humans 
are morally required to <l>Y But the metaethical and normative versions of 
DCT2 differ both in the sort of explanations they provide for the existence 
of particular moral obligations and in their implications about what moral 
obligations there are. DCT2-N explains particular moral requirements in 
terms of another normative state of affairs, that is, the general moral obliga-
tion to obey God. DCT2-M explains the existence of particular moral 
requirements simply in terms of God's power to actualize normative states 
of affairs; no normative states of affairs obtain prior to God's willing. This 
difference in explanation also produces a difference in normative implica-
tion. Since DCT2-N explains how God generates moral obligations in 
terms of the normative state of affairs that one is morally required to obey 
God, it follows trivially from DCT2-N that humans are under a moral 
requirement to obey God. DCT2-M does not have this implication, howev-
er; one can affirm DCT2-M yet deny DCT2-N. It is consistent to hold that 
all moral requirements are produced by God out of normative nothingness 
as DCT2-M claims, but that those moral requirements are those of (e.g.) 
utilitarianism rather than normative divine command theory. 
DCT2-M and DCT2-N are distinct theses; neither entails the other?" I 
shall argue that the positive reasons that have been brought forward in 
favor of DCT2 militate in favor of DCT2-M, but not DCT2-N. Thus, it is the 
DCT2-M formulation that should be accepted, if DCT2 ought to be accept-
ed at all. (This is one of those cases in which the specific formulation that a 
thesis receives depends on the positive reasons brought forward for 
accepting that thesis.) 
The reasons that have been brought forward in favor of DCT2 empha-
size certain divine attributes which would allegedly be compromised if 
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DCT2 were not the case; such attributes include, for example, God's being 
both omnipotent and impeccable, God's both having absolute liberty and 
being impeccable, and God's possessing absolute sovereignty over cre-
ation. While I will later remark briefly on the first two combinations of 
attributes,23 I will focus on the third. For the most detailed recent argument 
in favor of DCT2, that presented by Quinn, is that an appreciation of the 
doctrine of divine sovereignty lends support to DCT2. 
The doctrine that God is sovereign over creation is "that nothing distinct 
from God is independent of God."2-l The sense of dependence is metaphys-
ical: metaphysical dependence is an asymmetrical relation in which one 
state of affairs contributes to the obtaining of another state of affairs. The 
doctrine of divine sovereignty, then, asserts that states of affairs that are 
distinct" from God's existing are metaphysically dependent on God's will-
ing that they obtain. This interpretation of the doctrine Quinn takes to be a 
moderate one. On a weaker view, it is only contingent states of affairs that 
are metaphysically dependent on God's will; on a stronger view, all states 
of affairs, even those which involve or entail God's existence, are meta-
physically dependent on God's willing them. While Quinn disclaims 
knowledge of any conclusive arguments for the moderate interpretation, 
and professes merely to be following the "generally sound maxim that 
good things are apt to be found somewhere in the middle between 
extremes,"2!> it nevertheless seems clear why he inclines toward it: it allows 
for a fairly robust theological activism27 while avoiding the strangeness of 
the view that something that is logically necessary for God's willing (that 
is, God's existing) could nevertheless be metaphysically dependent on it.2R 
Acceptance of this moderate interpretation of the doctrine of divine sov-
ereignty provides support, though, for DCT2. Most states of affairs involv-
ing morality are obviously wholly distinct from God's existing. Lying's 
being morally forbidden and charity's being morally required are obvious-
ly distinct from God's existing, and so if God is sovereign over creation in 
this moderate sense then the obtaining of those normative states of affairs 
is dependent on God's willing that they obtain. It is clear, however, that 
this appeal to divine sovereignty over creation supports only DCT2-M, not 
DCT2-N. The doctrine of divine sovereignty does not itself support the 
view that any normative states of affairs obtain, and it does not show that 
the moral requirements that we are under are the result of a prior moral 
requirement to obey God. Rather, the appeal to sovereignty shows only 
that God's will must enter into any complete explanation of why a norma-
tive state of affairs obtains. 
It might be argued, though, that the doctrine of divine sovereignty does 
not establish DCT2-M, for there are some normative states of affairs whose 
obtaining cannot be shown to depend on God's will by the sort of argu-
ment that Quinn advances. Interestingly, one of these normative states of 
affairs is that expressed by DCT2-N. Quinn's moderate interpretation of 
divine sovereignty shows that moral requirements depend on God's will if 
they are wholly distinct from God's existing. But Quinn denies that the 
state of affairs described in DCT2-N is wholly distinct from the state of 
affairs of God's existing. He writes: 
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it might seem that [the thesis that all obtaining states of affairs wholly 
distinct from God's existing depend on God's will] is powerful 
enough to get us to the conclusion that all obtaining deontological 
states of affairs are metaphysically dependent on being willed by 
God. But this is not so, for the simple reason that not all obtaining 
deontological states of affairs are wholly distinct from God existing. 
Consider the state of affairs of obeying God being obligatory. 
According to theism, it surely obtains. Yet it seems clearly not to be 
wholly distinct from the state of affairs of God existing, because it 
apparently both involves and entails God existing.29 
Quinn underestimates the force of the moderate interpretation of divine 
sovereignty. Even the moderate interpretation, on my view, implies that 
the truth of theses like DCT2-N are metaphysically dependent on God's 
will. The reason is that, contrary to appearances, the state of affairs 
expressed by DCT2-N is wholly distinct from God's existing. 
Consider the following analogous case. Suppose that the state of affairs 
of its being morally obligatory to keep promises obtains. This state of 
affairs is, I think, wholly distinct from the existence of promises: one can 
conceive of its being morally obligatory to keep promises yet no one has 
made any; and one can accept that promise-keeping is obligatory while not 
accepting that there are any promises out there to keep. What this shows is 
that the moral requirement to keep promises is best thought of as not 
implying the existence of promises. It seems to me that the same point 
applies mutatis mutandis to the case of the moral requirement to obey God. 
One can (pace Anselm) conceive of God's non-existence while conceiving 
that it is morally obligatory to obey God, and one can accept the view that 
obedience to God is morally required while denying that God exists. What 
this would show, as in the case of promises, is that the moral requirement 
to obey God is best thought of as not implying God's existence.'" But if this 
moral requirement does not imply God's existence, then the state of affairs 
of its being morally obligatory to obey God is wholly distinct from that of 
God's existing." And if this is so, then the moderate doctrine of divine sov-
ereignty does not leave it as an open question whether the truth of DCT2-
N is independent of God's will. Rather, DCT2-N, whether a contingent or 
a necessary truth, is metaphysically dependent on God's will.32 
Theists who accept this moderate account of divine sovereignty, it 
seems, are committed to the acceptance of DCT2-M. Before turning to an 
examination of the difficulties with DCT2-M as a formulation of OCT, I 
want to note briefly that other divine attributes that have been brought for-
ward to support DCT2 militate in favor of DCT2-M rather than DCT2-N. It 
might be held that since God is both omnipotent and impeccable, DCT2 
must be the case. For if God cannot act in a way that is morally wrong, 
then God's power would be limited by other normative states of affairs 
were DCT2 not the case. One might make a similar argument with regard 
to divine liberty and impeccability: if moral requirements exist prior to 
God's willing them, requirements that an impeccable God could not vio-
late, God's liberty is compromised. I shall neither endorse nor reject these 
arguments for OCT."4 What is clear from these argument sketches, though, 
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is that it is not DCT2-N that is supported by these arguments but rather 
DCT2-M. DCT2-M denies the existence of any normative states of affairs 
that could exist prior to God's willing them; hence, prior normative states 
of affairs could neither constrain God's power to act (thus compromising 
His omnipotence) nor constrain God's freedom to act (thus compromising 
His liberty). The arguments from omnipotence, liberty, and impeccability 
support only a meta ethical, not a normative, version of DCT2. 
Quinn's argument from divine sovereignty does support DCT2-M; 
indeed, I think that his moderate interpretation of that doctrine provides 
for an even more thorough defense of that thesis than Quinn suggests. 
Further, I will grant arguendo that the argument sketches that take as their 
premises divine omnipotence, liberty, and impeccability can be filled out 
so that they imply DCT2-M. The failure of DCT2-M is not the absence of 
good arguments in its support. Rather, its failure is specifically as a formu-
lation of DCT: it is simply not distinctive; theists of all ethical stripes can 
accept it. It is too uncontroversial with respect to moral matters to be the 
preferred formulation of DCT.J5 
One way to approach the issue of DCT2-M's lack of distinctiveness is to 
note that the argument from divine sovereignty that implies DCT2-M is 
not domain-specific. This argument does not show that morality in particu-
lar depends on divine fiat; rather, it shows that all states of affairs (apart 
from God's existing, and what entails God's existing) depend on divine 
fiat. 36 What this means, of course, is that if one defends DCT2-M on the 
basis of such an argument, one is committed not only to a divine command 
theory of morality, but also to divine command theories of chemistry, biol-
ogy, physics, mathematics, economics, psychology, and accounting. But 
this should make the defender of DCT wonder if DCT2-M really is a strong 
enough doctrine. For if DCT2-M itself implies nothing more than that 
moral truths depend on God's will only to the extent that, and in the same 
way as, truths of physics depend on God's will, it is hard to see, at least 
from a theistic perspective, what the fuss is about divine command theo-
ries of ethics. 
That the doctrine of divine sovereignty implies that truths of morality 
might be dependent on God's will only to the extent that truths of physics 
are thus dependent suggests, however, that defenders of natural law theo-
ry, Kantianism, utilitarianism, and intuitionism should not be at all threat-
ened bv DCT2-M. The natural law theorist can make all of his or her nor-
mative~ claims, and can provide an account of how the normative states of 
affairs that obtain depend on facts about human nature, while conceding 
the whole of the case for DCT2-M. All that he or she has to assert, in addi-
tion to the claims that he or she makes about the connections between 
human nature and natural law, is that the truth of all of these claims 
depends on God's willing: perhaps on God's willing that there be beings 
with a certain nature, on God's willing the necessary state of affairs that 
those beings with this nature have certain reasons for action, and so forth. 
Kantians and classical utilitarians might make similar arguments, the for-
mer emphasizing God's willing that there be autonomous rational beings 
and the latter emphasizing God's willing that there be beings for whom 
(e.g.) pleasure is the good. Intuitionists might simply say that there are nec-
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essary truths about morality, just like there are necessary truths about math-
ematics; but, like all necessary truths concerning states of affairs wholly dis-
tinct from God's existing, their truth depends on God's willing them. 
DCT2-M, while non-trivial and perhaps even true, makes a claim vis-a-
vis morality that is simply too weak to serve as a formulation of DCT." Is 
there a way to modify DCT2-M to make it a clearly distinctive doctrine? 
One way to modify DCT2-M to ensure its distinctiveness would be to add 
that the relationship between the act of divine wiI1 and the moral obligation 
is a particularly direct one: that is, the state of affairs of 5' s being morally 
required to <I> depends directly on God's willing that 5 be morally required 
to <1>. What I have in mind here is that the dependence of the moral status of 
any act on God's will is unmediated and complete: there are no states of 
affairs with any explanatory power that mediate between God's will that an 
act be obligatory and the act's being obligatory, and there are no states of 
affairs other than God's willing that an act be obligatory that contributes to 
the act's being obligatory. Reformulating DCT2-M in terms of direct depen-
dence rather than dependence simpliciter would go quite a way toward 
making DCT distinctive. While my imagined natural law theorLst, Kantian, 
and utilitarian were perfectly willing to allow that on their views morality 
does depend on God's will, their accounts require that there be states of 
affairs with explanatory power that mediate between God's willing that a 
certain normative state of affairs obtain and the obtaining of that state of 
affairs. On (e.g.) the nalurallaw view, these mediating states of affairs are 
those having to do with the existence of creatures with a particular nature, 
the relationship of that nature to reasons for action, and so forth. We might 
say, though, that what makes DCT a distinctive doctrine is that it denies the 
existence of any such mediating state of affairs. The only explanation possi-
ble for the obtaining of a normative state of affairs like a moral requirement 
is that God wills that that state of affairs obtain.38 
The addition of the directness condition does seem to be a plausible way 
to make DCT2-M a distinctive moral thesis, about which moral theorists 
(even those sympathetic to the moderate interpretation of divine sover-
eignty) could disagree. The problem with DCT2-M in this modified ver-
sion is that its appeal to directness seems ad hoc, unmotivated by the con-
siderations that led us to adopt DCT2-M in the first place. Why would one 
who wholeheartedly embraces the doctrine of divine sovereignty be tempt-
ed to affirm DCT2-M in the direct dependence formulation in addition to 
DCT2-M in its unmodified version? In answering this question, it is 
worthwhile to consider again the fact that the argument from divine sover-
eignty does not militate only in favor of a divine command theory of 
morality but also in favor of a divine command theory of physics. While 
the defender of divine sovereignty should affirm that the obtaining of the 
state of affairs dealt with in physics must ultimately depend on the divine 
will, is the defender of that view committed to the claim that all explana-
tions of physical states of affairs must be directly and immediately referred 
to the divine will? Surely not; God's will that a particular state of affairs 
obtain may be carried out by means of the obtaining of other states of 
affairs, states of affairs that have of themselves some explanatory power. 
But, at least with regard to the considerations raised in the argument from 
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divine sovereignty, physical states of affairs are no different from norma-
tive states of affairs. If the doctrine of divine sovereignty gives us no rea-
son to hold a direct dependence view with regard to physics, neither does 
it give us reason to hold a direct dependence view with regard to ethics.39 
My view, then, is that while the argument from divine sovereignty does 
imply DCT2-M, DCT2-M is not a distinctive moral theory; and while 
DCT2-M can be modified so that it is distinctive, this distinctive formula-
tion lacks support from the argument for divine sovereignty. We thus lack 
reasons to prefer the DCT2-M formulation of OCT. 
DCT3 
What we have seen so far is that while some reasons can be given for pre-
ferring will formulations of DCT to the command formulation, DCT2 is not 
itself a distinctive doctrine. We may now turn to DCT3, which holds that 
S's being morally required to <p depends on God's willing that 5 <p. While 
this view has some obvious attractions - not the least of which is that the 
justification "I <p-ed because I thought that it was God's will" is common 
currency among theists - I shall postpone for a moment discussion of its 
less obvious positive features. What I want to focus on is the sense in 
which it could be true that one's being morally required to <p depends on 
God's willing that one <p. The difficulty that lurks in specifying such a 
sense is this. If one specifies a sense of willing that is too strong, it would 
follow that no one could possibly violate a moral requirement;40 if one 
specifies a sense of willing that is too weak, it does not seem appropriate to 
connect that sense to moral obligation; and it is not easy to specify a sense 
of willing that falls between these unacceptable extremes. 
The strong sense of "God wills that X" is that in which God intends that 
X. But this sense of will is too strong to be connected to moral require-
ments, for it can be shown that if God intends that X, then X obtains. This 
follows from God's being omniscient and God's being rational.'] If God is 
omniscient, then for every state of affairs R and every time t, God knows 
that R obtains at t or God knows that R does not obtain at t. Now suppose 
that God intends that R obtain at t. If, in addition to having this intention, 
God knows that R does not obtain at t, then God is irrational; for it is irra-
tional to intend some state of affairs that one knows will not obtain. But 
God is not irrational. So it must be the case that if God intends that R 
obtain at t, then it is not true that God knows that R does not obtain at t; 
rather, if God intends that R obtain at t, then God knows that R obtains at t. 
If God knows that R obtains at t, then R obtains at t. So, if God intends that 
R obtain at t, then R obtains at t; what God intends, God gets. 
But this result would show that the sense of will that is employed in 
DCT3 cannot be that of intention. For if the state of affairs of S's being 
morally obligated to <p depends on God's intending that 5 <p, and if whatev-
er God intends, God gets, then it follows that there has never been an occa-
sion on which a moral obligation was violated. But this is absurd. For if 
there are any convictions that are universally held among those who 
believe in moral requirements, it is that they are sometimes violated. 
We need, then, a sense of willing weaker than that of intending. One 
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possibility is to hold that in OCT3 God's willing should be construed as no 
more than God's wishing that S <\>, or having some sort of pro-attitude 
toward S's <\>-ing. God might have a pro-attitude toward some state of 
affairs yet not intend it, so that God's having such an attitude toward a 
state of affairs does not guarantee its obtaining. Now, some might find this 
proposal objectionable on the grounds that it seems possible that God have 
a pro-attitude both toward S's <\>-ing and toward S's refraining from <\>-ing/2 
for this possibility would imply the possibility of conflicting moral obliga-
tions. Whether one finds this a tolerable result will depend on one's views 
on moral dilemmas in general, and I will not press the issue here. But it 
seems to me that if we consider the different ways that actions might be 
liked by God, God's both liking an action and liking the refraining from 
that action is prone to be a ubiquitous phenomenon. But if conflicting 
moral obligations are ubiquitous, it becomes unclear why they should be 
thought of as obligations, and not just (perhaps) moral considerations, or 
moral reasons, or moral goods." 
This worry - that God's wishes or wants seem better assimilated to 
moral reasons, moral considerations, or moral goods than to moral obliga-
tion - can be appreciated even while denying the appropriateness of the 
remarks on the ubiquity of conflicting wishes. To wish for some state of 
affairs is in part just to think it good in some way; it is not to be set on it, 
aiming at it, planning on it. Does it not seem that God's wishes alone lack 
the strength or finality that we associate with moral obligation? The point 
can be made in a slightly different way. If one associates moral obligations 
with God's wishes, what could the weaker notion be in terms of which we 
can characterize moral goods? Does it not seem that God's wishes should 
be reserved for the explication of moral goodness,"" while a stronger notion 
should be put into place to account for moral obligation? 
Both the intention reading and the mere wish reading of OCT3 have 
positive features. The intention reading of OCT3 seems to provide a strong 
enough notion of willing to connect to moral obligation; the mere wish 
reading of OCT3 would allow for the possibility that moral obligations are 
violated. It seems that we should aim to specify a sense of God's willing 
that passes between these extremes, that is, that will be strong enough for 
obligation but not strong enough to preclude violation. 
Our attempt to pass between these extremes can be aided, I think, by an 
examination of Aquinas' own efforts to deal with the question: is it true 
that, necessarily, God's will is always fulfilled? The context of Aquinas' 
discussion is not moral philosophy, but rather the seeming incompatibility 
between God's willing that all humans be saved and the possibility that 
some humans will not be saved. While he asserts that in some sense it 
must be true that what God wills, God gets - and he defends this claim 
with an argument concerning God's status as universal cause - he also 
recognizes that there must be some sense in which God's will is not always 
fulfilled. God wills that all be saved, says Paul/s yet not all are saved. So 
Aquinas finds himself with a task rather similar to that which faces us: 
specifying a sense of will strong enough genuinely to be God's will and not 
strong enough that God's willing guarantees that the object of God's will-
ing will obtain. 
18 Faith and Philosophy 
While Aquinas provides three explanations for how it could be the case 
that God wills that all be saved yet not all are saved, only the third is rele-
vant to the solution of the difficulty that DCT3 faces.'" In the third explana-
tion Aquinas, drawing on Damascene, makes a distinction between God's 
antecedent will and God's consequent will. It is worth quoting his discus-
sion of this distinction at length: 
This distinction [between God's antecedent and consequent will] 
must not be taken as applying to the divine will itself, in which there 
is nothing antecedent or consequent, but to the things willed. 
To understand this we must consider that everything, insofar as it 
is good, is willed by God. A thing taken in its primary sense, and 
absolutely considered, may be good or evil, and yet when some addi-
tional circumstances are taken into account, by a consequent consid-
eration may be changed into the contrary. That a man should live is 
good; and that a man should be killed is evil, absolutely considered. 
But if in a particular case we add that a man is a murderer or danger-
ous to society, to kill him is a good; that he live is an evil. Hence it 
may be said of a just judge, that antecedently he wills all men to live; 
but consequently wills the murderer to be hanged.'7 
What Aquinas calls consequent willing is what God in fact wills, for "the 
will is directed to things as they are in themselves, and in themselves they 
exist under particular qualifications." Antecedent willing is, on the other 
hand, a relative abstraction, for we do not "will simply, what we will 
antecedently."" While it is possible, then, that what God antecedently 
wills does not come to pass, it is impossible that what God wills conse-
quently does not come to pass. Thus, Aquinas holds that antecedently 
God wills that all humans be saved, but He does not will this consequently. 
Aquinas' distinction can be used to solve the difficulty that faces the 
defender of DCT3. I argued that the intention interpretation of God's will-
ing is too strong, because what God intends, obtains. This seemed unfortu-
nate, because that interpretation seemed strong enough to connect to moral 
obligation. But we can say that all that the argument showed was that 
God's consequent intentions are all fulfilled. There remains the possibility 
that moral obligations can be held to depend on God's antecedent inten-
tions. These might be thought to have the requisite strength to be associat-
ed with moral requirements, and since not all of God's antecedent inten-
tions need be fulfilled, this assoCiation would not have the unwelcome 
implication that necessarily no moral obligations are violated.'9 
Now, if moral obligation is in DCT3 supposed to depend on God's 
antecedent intentions concerning human action, and the antecedent inten-
tions on which morality depends can differ from God's consequent inten-
tions (so that moral wrongdoing can occur), then there must be some cir-
cumstances which in some way account for the difference between God's 
antecedent and God's consequent intentions. (Recall the case of the just 
judge in Aquinas' example: antecedently, the judge intends that all 
humans live; consequently, the judge does not intend that all humans live. 
What accounts for this difference is that some humans are wrongdoers and 
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deserving of capital punishment.) But what circumstances could account 
for this difference? Deciphering God's seemingly inscrutable intentions 
might seem an impossibility here. But there is a set of circumstances to 
which it would be natural for us to appeal here, and these circumstances 
have to do with human choice. We might say, that is, that God intends 
antecedently that humans not murder each other; and so, on this interpre-
tation of DCT3, humans are morally obligated not to murder each other. 
But some humans do murder each other. This is possible, because God's 
antecedently willing that S <p does not entail that it is the case that S will <p. 
Given the actual circumstances of human life - that humans do choose to 
murder each other - God does not consequently intend that humans do 
not murder each other. (Note well: I do not assert here that God conse-
quently intends that humans murder each other, only that God does not 
consequently intend that humans do not murder each other. One might 
say, following the traditional insistence on the importance of there being a 
world in which free, effective choices can be made, that God consequently 
intends that humans make efficacious choices and that God merely accepts 
or allows that in some cases this efficacious choosing will result in humans' 
murdering each other.) 
Before we turn to the question of whether this is a plausible formulation 
of DCT, it is worth noting that this interpretation of DCT3 does not suffer 
from the failings that beset DCT1 and OCT2. Unlike on OCT1, on OCT3 
God's capacity to impose moral obligations is not objectionably contingent, 
depending on a very specific set of institutional facts. Rather, what is rele-
vant in a divine command is that God is expressing His antecedent inten-
tions regarding human action. And, unlike DCT2, OCT3 is clearly a dis-
tinctive and controversial moral doctrine. A variety of moral views, even 
moral views articulated within a theistic framework, would balk at the 
notion that morality depends in this way on God's intentions. 
I mentioned at the beginning of this section that one of the merits of 
DCT3 is that it is simply common currency among theists that one's actions 
can be justified by appealing to the fact that God wills that one perform 
those actions. The antecedent intention interpretation of DCT3 shows how 
this sort of view could be sustained. But there seem to me to be several 
other points in favor of this formulation of DCT; and I will conclude this 
paper by discussing four such points. The first has to do with the range of 
moral reasoning techniques that are sanctioned by OCT3; the second has to 
do with OCT3's ability to provide a satisfying account of the distinction 
between prima facie and ultima facie (or "all things considered") moral oblig-
ations; the third has to do with the fact that DCT3 entails certain commonly 
held and quite fundamental deontic principles; and the fourth has to do 
with the attractive picture of the moral life that is suggested by the particu-
lar interpretation of OCT3 that I have defended. 
One thing that makes DCT3 attractive as a formulation of DCT is that it 
sanctions a wide range of reasoning in the forming of moral judgments. 
Consider in this regard the contrast between OCT1 amd DCT3. Suppose 
that the defender of OCT1 has access to all of the divine commands avail-
able to him or her. It seems that the kind of moral reasoning that the 
defender of OCT1 can use to determine how to act morally in particular 
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circumstances is limited to determining what actions are necessary to carry 
out those commands. But note that the defender of DCT3 might have, in 
addition to this sort of means-end reasoning, other kinds of moral thinking 
at his or her disposal. Since divine commands are, on this view, relevant 
merely as expressions of God's will, one can rely on tenets of rational will-
ing to extrapolate God's will in other matters from His express commands. 
The primary example of such thinking that comes to mind here is analogi-
cal reasoning, which is widely used in judicial reasoning to come to legal 
judgments by extrapolating from explicit expressions of legislative will. 
Affirmation of DCT3 also makes available an account of the source of the 
distinction between prirna facie and ultima facie moral obligations. According 
to DCT3, moral obligation depends on antecedent intentions. Antecedent 
intentions are, however, relative abstractions; and since there are various 
levels of abstraction to which we can ascend in the ascription of such inten-
tions, there will be a variety of levels of antecedent intentions. We may 
characterize one's ultima facie moral obligations - those moral obligations 
by which we are bound, all things considered - as depending on God's 
antecedent intentions concerning one's actions which take into account all 
circumstances of action apart from what one actually chooses to do. One's 
merely prima facie obligations, on the other hand, depend on those of God's 
antecedent intentions concerning one's actions that abstract even more com-
pletely from the particular circumstances in which one must choose what to 
do. For example: it could be the case that God possesses antecedent inten-
tions both that Kant not tell lies and that Kant do what is necessary to pro-
tect innocent life. We may therefore say that Kant is under prima facie moral 
requirements to refrain from lying and to protect the innocent. Given a 
more specific description of Kant's choice situation, however - that there is 
an axe-murderer at the door inquiring as to the whereabouts of his potential 
victim - God's less abstract antecedent intention, which takes into account 
all relevant circumstances other than the agent's actual choice, might be that 
Kant lie in order to protect the axe-murderer's potential victim. If so, Kant's 
all-things-considered moral obligation is to tell the falsehood. The connec-
tion between moral obligation and antecedent intention, together with the 
variety of levels of abstraction at which antecedent intentions can be 
ascribed, suggests a natural way of explaining the distinction between prima 
facie and ultima facie moral obligations. 
DCT3 is also attractive in its fruitfulness: it is capable of providing 
defenses of several commonly held deontic theses that DCn cannot. 
Consider the following three moral theses: (1) if one is morally obligated to 
<p, and \jf-ing is a necessary means to <p-ing, then one is morally obligated to 
\jf; (2) if one is morally obligated to <p, then it is possible for one to <p (Uought 
implies can"); (3) if one is morally obligated to <p and is morally obligated 
to \jf, then one is morally obligated to <p and to \jf (tithe agglomeration prin-
cipleU50). Interestingly, DCT3's insistence that God's intentions about how 
we are to act determine our moral obligations provide for a defense of all 
three of these claims. (1) It is a tenet of rational intending that if one 
intends the end, then one intends the means. So, if God intends that S <p, 
and S's \jf-ing is necessary if S is to <p, then God (being rational) intends that 
S \jf. DCT3 thus implies that if S is morally obligated to <p, and \jf-ing is a 
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necessary means to <jl-ing, then 5 is morally obligated to \If.51 (2) It is a tenet 
of rational intending that one does not intend what one believes to be 
impossible. If God believes that it is impossible for 5 to <jl, then it is impos-
sible for 5 to <jl, and God (being rational) does not intend that 5 <jl. DCT3 
thus implies that if 5 is morally obligated to <jl, then it is possible for 5 to <jl. 
(3) It is a tenet of rational intending that one's separate intentions should 
be joined into an overarching plan, a larger intention, insofar as this is pos-
sible. It follows that if God intends that 5 <jl and God intends that 5 \If, then 
(being ideally rational) God intends that S both <jl and \If. DCn thus 
implies that if S is morally obligated to <jl and S is morally obligated to \If, 
then 5 is morally obligated both to <jl and to \If.52 
The fourth consideration in favor of DCT3 as a formulation of OCT is 
that it fits easily into what many divine command theorists might take to be 
an attractive view of the human role in God's creative activity. God, many 
theists believe, is provident: He has plans for creation, He orders things in a 
particular way, He governs the world. With regard to most aspects of 
God's plan, His intending can make it so. But we might think that this is 
not the case with regard to those aspects of God's plan that include free 
human actions: God's intending cannot simply make it the case that 
humans freely do what God wills. Rather, humans will have to choose 
freely to carry out the divine intentions. There is a sense, that is, in which 
the fulfillment of God's plan requires human cooperation.53 Note, though, 
that this view of the human place in God's creative activity goes some way 
toward making morality, as described by DCT3, intelligible within a theistic 
world view: God's commands make known to humans what they need to 
do in order to cooperate with God in His creative activity. This is, of course, 
no decisive argument. But from a theistic perspective it may be the 
strongest consideration in favor of DCT3 as the preferred formulation of 
OCT that it makes morality an intelligible part of an attractive picture of the 
relationship between free human agents and their provident Creator.'" 
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the specific obligations each of us has are the result of general moral obliga-
tions, those that apply to all agents, or to some proper subset of agents. This 
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shortcoming is easily remedied, though: one might reformulate OCTl as the 
claim that the state of affairs of S's being morally obligated to <\> depends on the 
state of affairs of God's commanding that all those agents falling under 
description 0 perform the act of <\>-ing, and S falls under description D. This 
reformulation of OCTl would coincide with the given formulation in cases in 
which God's command is to S only (thus description D would be "identical to 
S"). DCT2 and DCT3 could be reformulated in like manner. But since nothing 
in the sequel turns on the distinction between general and specific moral oblig-
ations, I will keep to the simpler formulations presented in the text. 
4. DCT is sometimes more than a theory of moral obligation, but it is at 
least that, and I will concentrate in this paper merely on the connection 
between God and moral obligation. Cf. Robert Merrihew Adams, "Divine 
Commands and the Social Nature of Obligation," Faith and Philosophy 4 (1987), 
pp. 262-275, p. 262 and William Alston, "Some Suggestions for Divine 
Command Theorists," in Christian Theism and the Problems of Philosophy, ed. 
Michael Beaty (Notre Dame, Indiana: University of Notre Dame Press, 1990), 
pp. 303-326, p. 304. 
5. I will not be able wholly to maintain silence on this issue; see the dis-
cussion of direct dependence with regard to the DCT2 formulation of DCT. 
6. See Adams '79, p. 76-77. (It seems, though, that the only reasons that he 
presents for endorsing such a formulation have to do with avoidance of wor-
ries regarding will formulations that we will deal with in our discussion of 
DCT3.) 
7. Janine Marie Idziak discusses what I would regard as historical precur-
sors of such an argument in "In Search of 'Good Positive Reasons' for an Ethics 
of Divine Commands: A Catalogue of Arguments," Faith Ilnd Philosophy 6 
(January, 1989), p. 55. 
8. See John Searle's discussion of promises and other illocutionary acts in 
Speech Acts (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1969), pp. 54-71, and his 
emphasis on institutional facts in the derivation of "ought" from "is" at pp. 
184-186. 
9. Searle '69, pp. 187-188. 
10. John Rawls, A Theory of Justice (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Belknap 
Press of Harvard University Press, 1971), pp. 344-346. 
11. A. John Simmons, Moral Principles and Political Obligations (Princeton: 
Princeton University Press, 1979), pp. 16-23, pp. 38-4l. 
12. Adams seems to present an argument similar to this analogical argu-
ment in Adams '87. He says that DCT is a "social theory of the nature of oblig-
ation" (p. 262), in which it is the relationships in which one stands to some 
other person or group of persons that is the framework within which certain 
actions are obligatory. On his view, these social requirements can arise only 
when a "demand is actually made" by one party of the relationship to another 
(p. 264). This seems to suggest that moral obligations, which arise from the 
relationship between God and human creatures, can only be imposed by God's 
actually issuing a command, and so Dcn would be the preferred formulation 
of OCT. But it seems to me that Adams gives no grounds for accepting this 
claim: the argument that he gives for DCTl is that social theories of obligation 
imply that any such obligation is the result of the something actually willed by 
one of the parties, not something that would be willed under certain circum-
stances. But this preference for actual will over hypothetical will can be satis-
fied just as easily by DCT2 or DCT3 as by DCTl. 
13. Aquinas (who on my view is no defender of OCT) says something like 
this in De Vcritate when he writes that knowledge is the means by which oblig-
ations are imposed, and on this basis concludes that unless all humans had a 
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natural knowledge of the first principles of the natural law it would not be the 
case that all humans were bound by those precepts. See Quaestiones Disputatae 
De Veritate, 17, 3. 
14. Howard Warrender, The Political Philosophy of Hobbes: His Theory of 
Obligation (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1957), pp. 14-15. 
15. A non-moral analogy might make this distinction clearer. Consider the 
event of a leaf's burning. The distinction between the causal role of the lit 
match being in contact with the leaf and the causal role of the leaf's not being 
wet corresponds to the difference between grounds of obligation (what makes 
an act obligatory) and validating conditions (the circumstances in which those 
grounds are able to make that act obligatory). 
16. Wierenga '83, p. 390. 
17. 1 do admit, though, that there is something troubling about the idea of 
God's commanding us to do something that He wills that we not do. 
18. Philip Quinn, "An Argument for Divine Command Ethics," in Christian 
Theism and the Problems of PhiLosophy, ed. Michael Beaty (Notre Dame, Indiana: 
University of Notre Dame Press, 1990b), p. 293 (emphasis added). One might 
claim that Quinn illicitly assumes that commands are equivalent to assertions 
about one's will: "Perform <1>" would be, on this view, equivalent to "I will that 
you <1>." These are of course not equivalent: the former is not truth-valuable, 
but the latter is. But Quinn does not say that commands are assertions of will, 
but that they are expressions of it. A mark of the correctness of this claim is that 
a command is not sincere if one commands another to <I> but does not will that 
the other <1>. Cf. Searle '69, p. 60. 
19. It might be thought strange that I would continue to affix the label 
"divine command theory" to the theses DCT2 and DCT3, since they place 
God's ,"lill rather than God's commands as the source of moral obligation. But 
it seems to me that "divine command theory" is a label used loosely to describe 
any theory of morality that holds that acts of God are at the foundation of 
morality; even Quiml, who explicitly favors DCT2 over DCIl, continues to call 
the view he defends a divine command theory. 
20. The term "metaethical" is sometimes used, particularly in the literature 
on OCT, to refer only to theories of the meanings of moral terms or the charac-
terization of moral properties. I use it more broadly than that. As I use the 
terms "normative" and "meta ethical" with regard to ethical theories, a norma-
tive theory includes evaluative statements, and a metaethical theory is merely 
an ethical theory that is not normative. 
21. it does not follow from the fact that all acts falling under description D 
are morally required that there is a moral requirement to perform acts falling 
under description D. It does not even follow that if necessarily all acts falling 
under description D are morally required then there is a moral requirement to 
perform acts falling under description D. With regard to the former case, the 
fact that each act under description 0 is morally required might be accidental; 
with regard to the latter case, the set of acts falling under description D might 
be necessarily coextensive with the set 01 acts falling under description E, and 
there might be a moral requirement to perform acts falling under description 
E. DCT2-M implies that all acts fitting the description "acting in accordance 
with what God has willed that humans be required to do" are morally 
required, but that does not mean that it implies that there is a moral require-
ment to obey God. 
22. A slight complication arises with regard to DCT2-N. Suppose that to <I> 
is "to do what God has willed that one be required to do"; in that case, DCT2-
N implies that the state of affairs of S's being morally obligated to do what God 
wills that one be required to do depends on the state of affairs of God's willing 
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that S be morally required to do what God wills that one be required to do. It 
thus appears that if God had not willed that normative state of affairs, then it 
would not have obtained; and this seems to imply that DCT2-N is a moral 
requirement that God willed into existence out of normative nothingness. But 
it seems to me that defenders of DCT2-N can avoid this result by restricting its 
scope in a suitable way. Wierenga, who defends a version of DCT2-N, claims 
that "the truth of divine command theory is independent of God. According to 
the theory I am presenting, what God determines is not that the divine com-
mand theory is true, but rather what our particular obligations are .... The 
general obligation to do what God commands is not, according to our theory, 
imposed by God" (Wierenga '83, p. 392). His strategy is to distinguish 
between act-types and act-tokens, and to hold that God is responsible only for 
the moral status of act-tokens; since "doing what God wills that one be 
required to do" is the name of an act-type, God is not, on Wierenga's view, to 
be considered the source of the moral status of that act-type. If I were to 
defend DCT2-N, I would resist Wierenga's solution: to reject the possibility 
that God can assign a moral status to an act-type as such seems an unnecessari-
ly extreme tack for the defender of DCT2-N to take. Rather, I would simply 
hold that DCT2-N is a second-order moral principle in the way that Kant's 
Categorical Imperative is a second-order moral principle: it assigns the status 
of morally permissible or impermissible to different first-order act-types in 
virtue of their conformity or lack of conformity to the act-description set out in 
that second-order principle. Thus, on Kant's view, the first-order act-type 
"lying" is impermissible because it is not an instance of the second-order act-
type "performing a universalizable act"; and for the defender of DCT2-N, the 
first-order act-type "professing one's faith" is obligatory because it is an 
instance of the second-order act-type "doing what God has willed that one be 
required to do." 
23. Idziak discusses the historical sources for arguments from omnipo-
tence, liberty, and impeccability in Idziak '89, pp. 51-53. See also her "Divine 
Command Morality: A Guide to the Literature" in Divine Command Morality: 
Historical and Contemporary Readings, ed. Idziak (New York: Edwin Mellen 
Press, 1979), pp. 8-9. 
24. Quinn '90b, pp. 293-294. 
25. Quinn defines distinctness of states of affairs to mean that each neither 
involves nor entails the other. The definitions of "involves" and "entails" that 
Quinn employs are drawn from Roderick Chisholm, The First Person: An Essay 
on Reference and Intentionality (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 
1981), p. 124: "The state of affairs p involves the state of affairs q = Of. P is nec-
essarily such that, whoever conceives it, conceives q" and "The state of affairs 
p entails the state of affairs q = Of. P is necessarily such that (i) if it obtains then 
q obtains and (ii) whoever accepts it accepts q." 
26. Quinn '90b, p. 295. 
27. Quinn '90b, p. 295. 
28. Quinn '90b, p. 299. For an account of how this sort of metaphysical 
dependence might be less strange than it first appears, see Thomas V. M{)rris 
and Christopher Menzel, "Absolute Creation," in Morris, Anselmian 
Explorations (Notre Dame, Indiana: University of Notre Dame Press, 1987), pp. 
174-176. 
29. Quinn '90b, p. 298. 
30. It is worth noting that it seems possible that the theist and the atheist 
agree that it is morally obligatory to obey God, differing only on whether there 
is such a being. 
31. Perhaps a better analogy would be "It is obligatory for soldiers to obey 
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their superior officers." This statement of obligation does not imply that there 
are soldiers. 
32. One could object: it may be true that the state of affairs described by 
OCT2-N, interpreted as the claim that obedience to God (should God exist) is 
obligatory, is wholly distinct from God's existing. But on another interpreta-
tion of DCT2-N, where that thesis is interpreted as the claim that obedience to 
God (who does in fact exist) is obligatory, it is false that the deontological state 
of affairs picked out by that thesis is wholly distinct from God's existing. I sup-
pose this might be true. But we can say that even if this state of affairs is not 
wholly distinct from God's existing, whatever is deontological about it surely is. 
33. One might think that, given God's impeccability, His omnipotence 
and/ or liberty could be protected only were it the case that all normative states 
of affairs are contingent. It is not clear, however, that one is forced to this 
result. One could hold that some such states of affairs are necessary, but their 
necessity is from the divine nature, so that God's power and/or liberty is not 
constrained by something distinct from God. Whether one accepts this line of 
reasoning will of course depend on one's interpretations of divine omnipo-
tence and divine liberty. 
34. Though it should be noted that the argument from divine liberty seems 
only to show that moral principles that apply to God's actions must depend on 
the divine will. 
35. Note: I say "with regard to moral matters." DCT2-M is of course con-
troversial in itself. 
36. The same line of reasoning can be spelled out with regard to the argu-
ments from omnipotence, liberty, and impeccability. 
37. Another way to put this is to say that if this is the only version of OCT 
that is defensible, then DCT should not be considered a contestant among 
moral theories, but rather simply a claim about morality generated by certain 
theological doctrines. 
38. Note that this way of trying to make OCT distinctive does not distin-
guish the intuitionist that takes the doctrine of divine sovereignty seriously 
from the defender of OCT2-M. This might not be an objection, though; per-
haps once we are able to distinguish DCT from a number of other moral views 
to which theists have been sympathetic, like natural law theory, Kantianism, 
and utilitarianism, that the best version of DCT turns out to be a theistic variant 
of one particular moral theory is not such bad news. 
39. Some - a very few - might hold that a proper understanding of divine 
sovereignty does commit one to a direct dependence view in physics and ethics 
alike. To hold such a direct dependence view with regard to the natural order is 
to affirm occasionalism, the doctrine that "God is the only cause of [natural] phe-
nomena. In other words, loccasionalists1 have denied that there is any such 
thing as genuine secondary (i.e., creaturely) causation in nature" (Alfred J. 
Freddoso, "Medieval Aristotelianism and the Case against Secondary Causation 
in Nature," in Thomas Morris, ed., Divine and Human Actio1l: Essays in the 
Metaphysics of Theism [Ithaca, New York: Cornell University Press, 19881, pp. 74-
118, p. 76). As Freddoso points out, some theistic philosophers have been 
attracted to this view because for them it is the only account of the relationship 
between God and nature that does justice to God's complete sovereignty over 
creation (Freddoso '88, p. 74-77). Very few philosophers find occasionalism at 
all attractive, however; indeed, even Quinn himself explicitly rejects occasional-
ism as the best account of God's relationship to the natural order, arguing that 
his own moderate "conservationist" view "can avoid being tarred with the ugly 
brush of occasionalism" (Quinn, "Divine Conservation, Secondary Causes, and 
Occasionalism," in Divine and Human Action, pp. 50-73, p. 73). 
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40. Adams alludes to this worry in Adams 79, p. 76. 
41. It might be thought that a quicker and more intuitively appealing argu-
ment for the "what God intends, God gets" thesis can be made in terms of 
God's omnipotence: if God intends some state of affairs, then God's being all-
powerful guarantees that this state of affairs will obtain. Even assuming that 
God intends nothing impossible (an assumption that would require mention of 
God's rationality if it were to be defended), this argument would fall short if it 
is true, as it has been argued by Alvin Plantinga, that there are some possible 
worlds that even an omnipotent God could not have actualized. To assume 
that God could actualize all possible worlds is to commit "Leibniz's Lapse"; 
see Plantinga, The Nature of Necessity (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1974), p. 184. 
42. Quinn allows for this possibility in his thorough account of how axio-
logical terms can be given a OCT interpretation; he refers to states of affairs 
such that God wishes that they obtain and that God wishes that they fail to 
obtain as "extraordinary." See Quinn 78, p. 69. 
43. Note that if one thinks that there cannot be conflicting moral obliga-
tions, this might be a reason to want something like the intention interpretation 
of God's willing: for it is irrational to have intentions that are not mutually sat-
isfiable, and God is not irrational; hence, God has no conflicting intentions. 
There could therefore not be conflicting moral obligations. As we will see, the 
interpretation of DCT3 that I defend below preserves this result. 
44. As Quinn in fact does in Quinn 78, pp. 67-71. 
45. 1 Timothlf 2:3-4. 
46. In the first explanation, Aquinas (following Augustine) suggests that all 
that is meant by the claim that God wills all to be saved is that there is no saved 
person that God did not will to be saved; in the second, he suggests that the 
claim might be construed as asserting that there are some humans of all condi-
tions that God wills to be saved, not as asserting that God wills that all humans 
of all conditions be saved. See ST la 19,6 ad 1. 
47. Aquinas, ST la 19,6 ad 1. 
48. Aquinas, ST la 19, 6 ad 1. 
49. It might be wondered why we would want to ascribe antecedent inten-
tions to God, or to any other agent. It seems to me that the rationale for ascrib-
ing such intentions to an agent is both to explain that agent's consequent inten-
tions and to ground the truth-values of counterfactual claims about what that 
agent would intend were the circumstances of action different. 
50. Bernard Williams discusses (and names) the agglomeration principle in 
his "Ethical Consistency," in Problems of the Self (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1973), pp. 180-182. 
51. Doesn't OCTl have this implication, since, as I pointed out, one can rea-
son about the necessary means to fulfilling commands? The answer is no. 
Suppose that one has a moral obligation to <il, and by reasoning discovers that 
\jf-ing is a necessary means to <il-ing; nevertheless, he or she does not \jf. OCT1 
implies only that the moral obligation to <il has been broken; not \j1-ing only 
guarantees that the obligation to <il will not be kept. Only by adding a moral 
premise to DCTl - that if one is morally required to <il, then one is morally 
required to perform any act that is a necessary means to <il-ing - can one con-
clude that one is morally required to \jf in such a case. DCT3, on the other 
hand, does not require an additional moral premise to achieve this result: it 
relies only on a premise about God's rational intending. 
52. These points are indebted to Christopher Gowans' intention-prescrip-
tivist arguments for the agglomeration and "ought implies can" principles in 
Innocence Lost: A Defense of Inescapable Wrongdoing (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 1994), pp. 65-85. Note that if DCT3 is true, then there cannot be moral 
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dilemmas: for moral dilemmas require inconsistent ultima facie moral obliga-
tions, the presence of which would entail that Cod has inconsistent intentions. 
But since Cod is not irrational, Cod does not have inconsistent intentions. 
One might object that since antecedent intentions can be inconsistent with-
out irrationality, one cannot employ the claim that Cod's rationality precludes 
inconsistent antecedent intentions in rejecting the possibility of moral dilem-
mas. One might say, for example, that Cod would clearly be rational to intend 
both that persons' legs not be amputated and that physicians amputate when 
necessary to save the patient's life; but since there are obviously cases in which 
these antecedent intentions are inconsistent - sometimes the only way for 
physicians to save life is to amputate - it cannot be true that rationality pre-
cludes having inconsistent antecedent intentions. But this sort of example 
need not provide a case of inconsistent intentions. Either these antecedent 
intentions are ascribed to God in abstraction from its being the case that some-
times physicians must amputate in order to save life, or they are not. If they 
are, then there is no inconsistency involved: for, abstracting from the sometime 
necessity for amputation, these intentions are co-realizable. If they are not, 
then there is an inconsistency involved: God intends that both of these states of 
affairs obtain, but these states of affairs cannot both obtain in a world where it 
is sometimes necessary for physicians to amputate in order to save their 
patients' lives. God would be irrational to possess both of these intentions in 
light of this circumstance. Thus, this sort of case provides no reason to think 
that a rational God could possess inconsistent antecedent intentions. But cases 
of genuine moral dilemmas must, according to DCT3, involve inconsistent 
antecedent intentions. Since according to DCT3's interpretation of ultima facie 
obligations, all such obligations depend on God's antecedent intentions that 
abstract only from what the agent actually chooses to do, unavoidable moral 
wrongdoing could arise only from God's possessing inconsistent intentions, a 
state of affairs that is precluded by Cod's eminent rationality. 
53. For discussions of human cooperation with Cod from the perspective 
of natural law theory, see John Finnis, Natural Law and Natural Rights (Oxford: 
Clarendon Press, 1980), p. 409, and Germain Grisez, Joseph Boyle, and John 
Finnis, "Practical Principles, Moral Truth, and Ultimate Ends," American 
Journal of Jurisprudence 32 (1987), pp. 143-145. 
54. lowe thanks to Robert Adams, William Alston, Trenton Merricks, 
Philip Quinn, and Thomas Williams, whose comments and criticisms made 
this paper better than it otherwise would have been. 
